

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07

L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

ERDA-05 OIC-02 OMB-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 TRSE-00 ACDA-05

BIB-01 OES-03 EB-07 CIEP-01 COME-00 STR-01 HEW-02

AF-06 NEA-09 CU-02 /114 W  
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R 121805Z MAR 75

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1336

ALL CSCE CAPITALS 258

AMEMBASSY OSLO

USNMR SHAPE

USLO SACLANT NORFOLK VA

CINCLANT

USCINCEUR

USDOCOSOUTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 1713

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, PFOR, PARM, XG

SUBJECT: CSCE: CBMS-CANADIAN PROPOSAL ON NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS

REF: (A) GENEVA 1516; (B) STATE 055038 NOTAL; (C) STATE 47647

1. SUMMARY: FURTHER ALLIED CBMS CAUCUS DISCUSSION OF CANADIAN PROPOSAL HAS RESULTED IN CONSENSUS THAT IDEA SHOULD NOT BE BROACHED WITH OTHERS BEFORE EASTER, BUT HAS ALSO REVEALED THAT SUBSTANTIAL GROUP OF ALLIES INCLUDING FRANCE AND FRG FAVOR EARLY USE OF CANADIAN APPROACH IN POST-EASTER PERIOD, ON GROUNDS THAT SOVIETS UNLIKELY TO BE STIMULATED TO MOVE OTHERWISE, THAT CANADIAN PROPOSAL DOES NOT COMPROMISE ESSENTIAL ALLIED POSITIONS, AND THAT NEW MOVE WOULD REFOCUS INTEREST IN OTHERWISE STALE SUBCOMMITTEE CBM DEBATE. UK AND OTHERS HAVE  
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JOINED US IN MORE GUARDED VIEW THAT ALLIES SHOULD HOLD FIRM

TO PRESENT CLEAR POSITIONS ON MANEUVER PARAMETERS AT LEAST UNTIL SOVIETS GIVE SIGNAL OF WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE ON THIS ISSUE. CAUCUS REPS AGREED ON MARCH 12 TO REPORT BACK TO CHIEFS OF DELEGATIONS AND CAPITALS ON THIS DIVERGENCE OF VIEWS, BUT AT SAME TIME TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON MOST DESIRABLE MANNER OF PRESENTING CANADIAN APPROACH, IN THE EVEN THAT ALLIED CONSENSUS DEVELOPS TO USE IT AT SOME FUTURE TIME. END SUMMARY.

2. SINCE REFTTEL, ALLIES IN FURTHER CAUCUS DISCUSSIONS OF CANADIAN INITIATIVE ON MARCH 7, 10, AND 12 HAVE COME TO GENERALLY AGREED CONCLUSION THAT IDEA SHOULD NOT BE BROACHED WITH OTHERS BEFORE EASTER BREAK. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO CONSENSUS YET ON WHETHER AND HOW CANADIAN PROPOSAL MIGHT BE USED THEREAFTER. REPS OF FRANCE, GERMANY, NETHERLANDS, GREECE AND ITALY HAVE ARGUED WITH SOME FORCE FOR MOVING AHEAD TOWARDS PRESENTATION IN SUBCOMMITTEE ALONG CANADIAN LINES PROMPTLY AND WITHOUT ANY PRECONDITIONS, ON GROUNDS THAT SOVIETS ARE UNLIKELY TO MAKE ANY SIGNIFICANT MOVE FROM PRESENT POSITION ON MANEUVER PARAMETERS UNTIL LAST DAYS OF STAGE II, UNLESS THERE IS SOME NEW IMPETUS. VISITING FRG REPS FROM BONN AND BRUSSELS (WAGNER AND CITRON) STATED GERMAN CONCLUSION IN MARCH 12 CAUCUS THAT ADVANTAGES IN CANADIAN APPROACH OUTWEIGH RISKS, THE ADVANTAGES BEING:

(A) APPROACH WOULD RESTIMULATE INTEREST IN IMPORTANT SUBSTANTIVE WORK OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON CBM'S, WITHOUT CONCEDING ESSENTIAL NATO POSITIONS THAT ADVANCE NOTIFICATION MUST BE ADDRESSED TO ALL CSCE PARTICIPANTS AND MUST APPLY IN ALL OF EUROPE EXCEPT PARTS OF EUROPEAN USSR;

(B) APPROACH WOULD HAVE OPTICAL ATTRACTIVENESS TO NEUTRALS, SINCE IT CONTAINS THEIR SUGGESTED CBM PARAMETERS AS WELL AS NATO'S, AND COULD BE PRESENTED TO PACT AS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT PACT'S DESIRED PARAMETERS AS WELL;

(C) PACT COULD NOT SIMPLY IGNORE CANADIAN APPROACH, BUT WOULD NEED TO TAKE A POSITION AND THUS REOPEN DEBATE ON CBM'S, WHICH HAS LAPSED IN RECENT MONTHS BECAUSE THERE IS NOTHING NEW TO SAY.

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3. AS ADDITIONAL REASONS FOR INTRODUCING CANADIAN APPROACH AFTER EASTER, OTHERS IN CAUCUS HAVE CITED REPORTS THAT NEUTRALS MAY BE CONTEMPLATING AN INITIATIVE TO BREAK THE ICE ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS, AND EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THEY MIGHT DO SO IN A MANNER THAT WOULD UNDERCUT ALLIED POSITIONS. THEY HAVE ALSO MAINTAINED THAT THE CANADIAN PROPOSAL WILL LOSE NEGOTIATING VALUE IF IT LEAKS WITHOUT

PROMPT AND FORCEFUL FOLLOW-UP BY THE ALLIES. (THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THUS FAR THAT THE TERMS OF THE CANADIAN PROPOSAL HAVE IN FACT LEAKED, BUT THE NEUTRALS AT LEAST ARE AWARE THAT THE ALLIES HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT APPROACH ON ADVANCE NOTIFICATION PARAMETERS.)

4. MORE CONSERVATIVE U.S. VIEW ON CANADIAN APPROACH HAS BEEN SHARED BY UK, NORWAY, AND TURKEY, WHO HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT USING THE CANADIAN INITIATIVE BEFORE THE SOVIETS GIVE FURTHER EVIDENCE OF WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE ON PARAMETERS, AND HAVE NOT COMMITTED THEMSELVES ON WHETHER IT SHOULD BE USED EVEN THEN. AS REPORTED REFTEL A THE UK HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE COMPLEXITY OF THE CANADIAN MATRIX, FOR FEAR THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT CAPITALIZE ON IT TO ARGUE FOR A SIMPLE "POLITICAL" SOLUTION THAT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST. THE NORWEGIANS ALSO BELIEVE THE CANADIAN IDEA MAY BE TOO TECHNICAL FOR THE CSCE. BELGIAN REP HAS EXPRESSED ADDITIONAL MISGIVINGS THAT CANADIAN IDEA APPEARS TO INVOLVE NEW ALLIED CONCESSIONS ON AREA OF APPLICATION IN USSR, INASMUCH AS ALLIES HAVE HERETOFORE INSISTED THAT ALL NOTIFICATIONS SHOULD APPLY WITHIN 700-KILOMETER RADIUS OF SOVIET BORDERS.

5. DESPITE THESE RESERVATIONS, DELEGATIONS THAT OPPOSE IMMEDIATE USE OF CANADIAN PROPOSAL ON TACTICAL GROUNDS HAVE ALL STATED THAT THEY ARE KEEPING AN OPEN MIND ON POSSIBILITY OF USING IT EVENTUALLY, AND ALL ADMIT THAT IT MIGHT HAVE TACTICAL ADVANTAGES IN THE APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES. IN REPLY TO BELGIAN CRITICISM, THE CANADIAN REP SAID MATRIX COULD BE MODIFIED TO INCREASE AREA OF USSR COVERED FOR NOTIFICATION OF REINFORCED DIVISION MANEUVERS FROM 350 TO 500 KILOMETERS. CANADIAN REP ALSO OBSERVED THAT PROPOSAL WOULD INVOLVE MORE CONTENT IN NOTIFICATION OF LARGER  
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MANEUVERS THAN PRESENTLY CONTEMPLATED IN ALLIED PARAMETERS, SO THAT ALLIED CONCESSIONS ON AREA IN USSR COULD BE SEEN AS BALANCED BY STRONGER ALLIED POSITION ON CONTENT.

6. FOR THE EVENTUALITY THAT ALLIES MIGHT AT SOME POINT DECIDE TO USE CANADIAN IDEA, A NUMBER OF IDEAS HAVE BEEN FLOATED IN CAUCUS DISCUSSIONS ON POSSIBLE TACTICS:

A. PROPOSAL SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AND PERHAPS MODIFIED IN INFORMAL CONTACTS WITH NEUTRALS PRIOR TO FORMAL INTRODUCTION IN SUBCOMMITTEE;

B. INTRODUCTION OF DETAILED MATRIX SHOULD BE PRECED BY A GENERAL EXPLANATORY STATEMENT; I.E., LAYING OUT IDEA THAT THERE COULD BE DIFFERENTIATED TIMING OF NOTIFICATION, CONTENT,

AND APPLICABLE AREA OF USSR, DEPENDING ON SIZE OF MANEUVER;

C. POSSIBILITY THAT CANADIAN IDEA COULD BE PRESENTED TO SOVIETS AT SAME TIME AS NEW, REDUCED ALLIED GOALS ON MOVEMENTS CBM, AS A FURTHER DEMONSTRATION OF ALLIED FLEXIBILITY;

D. POSSIBILITY THAT USE OF CANADIAN PROPOSAL SHOULD IN SOME MANNER BE LINKED WITH WORK OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON PRINCIPLES (I.E., A REVIVAL OF EARLIER EC-9 POSITION AT LATE JANUARY DUBLIN MEETING).

7. CAUCUS REPS AGREED ON MARCH 12 TO REPORT BACK TO CHIEFS OF DELEGATIONS AND CAPITALS ON THESE DISCUSSIONS, MAKING CLEAR THAT NO CONSENSUS HAS BEEN REACHED ON IF AND WHEN CANADIAN PROPOSAL MIGHT BE USED WITH OTHER CSCE PARTICIPANTS. AT SAME TIME, CAUCUS WILL CONTINUE DISCUSSION OF HOW CANADIAN IDEA MIGHT BEST BE PRESENTED, IF THERE WERE AN EVENTUAL ALLIED CONSENSUS TO PUT IT FORWARD.

8. RE REF B, US REP HAS MADE CLEAR IN CAUCUS DISCUSSIONS THAT INSTRUCTIONS IN REF C APPLY ONLY TO TACTICS, AND THAT US IS FOR TIME BEING RESERVING JUDGMENT ON MERITS OF CANADIAN PROPOSAL IN SUBSTANCE. DALE

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** CBMS, POLICIES, COMMITTEE MEETINGS  
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**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 12 MAR 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 75 GENEVA 1516, 75 STATE 055038, 75 STATE 47647  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 16 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <16 APR 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <17 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** CSCE: CBMS-CANADIAN PROPOSAL ON NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS  
**TAGS:** PFOR, PARM, XG, CA, CSCE  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006